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A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF AUM SHINRIKYO: 
UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA. 
Stuart Koschade 
PhD Candidate 
Centre for Social Change Research 
 
Social network analysis offers the ability to firstly map a covert cell, and to 
secondly measure the specific structural and interactional criteria of such a 
cell. The method also endows the analyst the ability to measure the level of 
covertness and efficiency of the cell as a whole, and also the level of activity, 
ability to access others, and the level of control over a network each individual 
possesses. The measurement of these criteria allows specific counter-
terrorism applications to be drawn, and assists in the assessment of the most 
effective methods of disrupting and neutralising a terrorist cell. This article will 
attempt to contribute to and advance the growing literature on social network 
analysis and terrorism studies through a social network analysis of the 
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cell that produced the toxic nerve gas Sarin in 
Western Australia between early 1993 and late 1994. Through this 
application, this article will endeavour to provide research into terrorism in 
Australia, more specifically, understanding and explaining the operations and 
elements of the modus operandi of terrorist groups in Australia, an area which 
has received critically little attention.  
 
 
Keywords: Aum Shinrikyo; social network analysis; terrorism; terrorism in 
Australia; Shoko Asahara. 
 
Despite a reasonably significant history of terrorism in Australia, there has been very 
little research on terrorism in this country. There have been some significant works in 
the field that have examined the phenomenon of terrorism in Australia, such as 
Clifford’s 1981 article, ‘Terrorism: Australia’s Quiet War’, which examined the history 
of terrorism in Australia, and the balance between liberty and security in counter-
terrorism measures and legislation.1 Wardlaw’s article ‘Terrorism and Public 
Disorder: The Australian Context’, examined the validity of the threat of terrorism in 
Australia in contrast to the sensationalisation of the phenomenon by the Australian 
media.2 Australia: The Terrorist Connection by Crown in 1986 added to the academic 
literature within the field. Crown’s book examined Australia’s position within the 
1980s world of International Terrorism, and moved to discuss hypothetical terrorist 
events in Australia and the counter-terrorist responses that the Australian 
Government had in place.3 Crown offered his assessment of terrorism studies in the 
Australian context: 
far too little has been written about the terrorist threat and the potential for politically 
motivated violence this country faces…In order to document the facts I have quoted 
throughout this book I have turned to the only source of record available on the 
Australian scene – newspapers, magazines, and the recollections of individuals 
involved and the journalists who reported these incidents.4
 
Six years later, Hocking met the call of Crown in her book Beyond Terrorism: The 
Development of the Australian Security State, which provided a comprehensive 
account of the development of Australia’s intelligence agencies. In this piece Hocking 
examined in detail the justification and legality of the call out of the Australian 
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Defence Force in the wake of the 1978 Hilton Bombing.5 Hocking added to this book 
in her 2004 Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy 
which examined the anti-terrorism legislation introduced into Australia following the 
al-Qaeda attacks in the United States (US) in 2001, and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
bombing in Bali in 2002.6
 
This brief review illustrates that while there have been valuable contributions to the 
Australian context of terrorism studies from the legal, historical, and counter-terrorism 
perspectives that focus on descriptive summaries of terrorist groups and events, 
there has been little substantive analysis that focuses on a richer understanding of 
the various aspects of the modus operandi (particularly the communication, 
interaction, and formation) of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia. The 
pursuit of such understanding promises to advance the field within Australia and 
provide significant counter-terrorism applications and insights. 
 
The objective of this article is to contribute to this area by synthesising the initial 
results from the author’s doctoral thesis, which conducts a Social Network Analysis of 
three terrorist cells that operated in Australia: the Croatian Revolutionary 
Brotherhood, Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), and Laskhar-e-Taiba (Army of the 
Pure/Righteous). The thesis will also examines the JI cell behind the 2002 Bali 
bombings for projections of how the group would operate in future operations, and in 
Australia.  
 
This article will conduct a social network analysis to map and measure the network 
criteria of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist cell that operated in Western Australia in 1993. 
This analysis will attempt to provide significant insight and understanding into the 
communication and interaction within this terrorist cell. From this analysis, 
destabilisation techniques will be applied to the cell in an attempt to discover 
appropriate counter-terrorism applications for their use against future cells that 
operate in a similar fashion. 
 
 
Social Network Analysis 
 
Social network analysis is a methodological form of analysis that is based on 
mathematical, psychological, anthropological, and sociological applications of 
interaction and communication.7 This framework aims to connect the dots between 
individuals and “map and measure complex, sometimes covert, human groups and 
organisations”.8 The method focuses on uncovering the patterning of people’s 
interaction,9 and correctly interpreting these networks assists “in predicting behaviour 
and decision-making within the network”.10 Furthermore, the “ability to understand 
and predict behaviour of members in a social network allows the analyst to evaluate 
specific courses of action that will influence the members of a social network in a 
desirable manner”.11 In short, social network analysis “provides a useful way of 
structuring knowledge and framing further research. Ideally it can also enhance an 
analyst’s predictive capability”.12
 
 
Method 
 
This social network analysis will be conducted through four stages: 1) The Contextual 
Background; 2) the Relational Data Stage; 3) Network Criteria Analysis, and; 4) 
Destabilisation Techniques.  
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Contextual Background 
 
The contextual background essentially aims to comprehensively document the 
physical environment of the network, the group itself, the individuals within it, and the 
interaction between these individuals. 
 
 
 
Relational Data Stage 
 
The relational data stage identifies the individuals that are considered to be within the 
cell, and the relations between them through the contextual background. These 
relations are stored within a binary member by member adjacency matrix. In this 
matrix, an interaction between two members is illustrated with a 1, while no 
interaction between members is signified by a 0. This merely indicates whether a 
relationship exists or not. It was not possible to further detail and measure the 
strengths of the levels of interaction between the Aum Shinrikyo members within this 
analysis; as such data does not exist and is only known to the Aum members who 
were on the property. From the binary matrix, the cell will be mapped through the 
construction of a sociograph; this will be done through the network analysis program 
UCINET Version 6.69.13  
 
 
Structural Criteria Analysis 
 
The third stage will calculate the structural criteria of the network. The network and 
individual level structural criteria that have been employed in this analysis are: Size; 
Density; Degree of Connexion; Average Communication Speed; Actor Degree 
Centrality; Betweenness Centrality; Closeness Centrality, and; Clusters.i These 
criteria will be determined through the traditional equations employed within the field, 
and will be calculated through UCINET. The results will be standardised as a 
percentage (for density, average communication speed, centrality, closeness, and 
betweenness), a score of 0 being the lowest possible score, and 100 the maximum. 
  
Size 
The size measure is simply the number of nodes within the dataset, however 
Boissevain describes size as the “most important structural criterion of 
a…network…this is because the other criteria are calculated as a proportion of the 
total possible or actual links in the network”.14  
 
Density 
Density is described as the “the average proportion of lines incident with nodes in the 
graph”,15 or “the extent to which links that could possibly exist among persons do in 
fact exist”.16 A high density indicates that the network has a high level of efficiency 
but a low level of covertness, conversely, a low density score means that the network 
has a high level of covertness, and a low level of efficiency.  
 
Degree of Connexion 
                                                 
i Measures such as the Clique Count have been disregarded, as they are ineffectual when examining the 
Aum network. 
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This criterion allows the measure of the average number of relations each member 
has with other members of the network.17 This criterion can qualify the results of 
density equations, and allow further comparative analysis between networks.  
 
Average Communication Speed 
The average communication speed is calculated through the average shortest path 
between each node in the network. This measure further assists the density and 
degree of connexion measures in determining the effectiveness of the 
communication within the cell. This measure is very useful when attempting to 
destabilise these networks, and comparing the reduction in information flow and 
speed.18  
 
Actor Level Degree Centrality 
Actor level degree centrality is the level at which a node is accessible to the other 
individuals within the network. Centrality is affected not only by the size of a network, 
but by the formation and shape of the network.19 This measure assists the analyst to 
identify the leaders within networks, this does not entail that they necessarily hold the 
power in the relationships or indeed the network, however an individual’s centrality 
indicates a critical importance within the network.  
 
Closeness Centrality 
The second individual level measure is closeness centrality. Closeness describes 
how close an actor is to others in the network, or the ability of actors within a network 
to access others.20 This is a vital measure that assists in assessing the importance of 
each node in the context of their network.  
 
Betweenness Centrality 
The betweenness structural criterion is another measure of an individual’s 
activity/ability within a network, measuring the ability to control the flow of information 
within a network.21 Like the other measures of centrality, this criterion allows the 
identification of individuals with greater ability to control the communication and 
exchange within a network.  
 
Clusters 
The final structural criterion was the clusters measure. Clusters are sections of a 
network that are have a higher density than other sections. As such, more dense 
clusters are areas of a network with higher efficiency. 
 
 
Destabilisation Techniques 
 
In their paper, Destabilising Networks, Carley, Lee, and Krackhardt22 propose three 
indicators of destabilisation within a network. The first is “where the rate of 
information flow through the network has been seriously reduced, possibly to zero”.23 
The second is “that the network, as a decision-making body, can no longer reach 
consensus, or takes much longer to do so”.24  The third indicator of destabilisation is 
“that the network as an organisation, is less effective; eg, its accuracy at doing tasks 
or interpreting information has been impaired”.25  
 
Counter-terrorism techniques traditionally aim at neutralising members of terrorist 
networks either through capture or death. The removal of a node from a network can 
make a cell less able to adapt, reduce its performance, reduce its ability to 
communicate, or have no effect at all. 26 The structural criteria outlined above allow 
the identification of the most important and well connected individuals within a 
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network, through their high centrality scores. These nodes are known as the ‘critical’ 
nodes within a network.27 The removal or isolation of these nodes ensures maximum 
damage to the network’s ability to adapt, performance, and ability to communicate. 
As this article examines small scale cells as oppose to large scale networks, 
disruption techniques aimed at immediate and maximum disruption will be employed. 
 
In endeavouring to effectively destabilise the networks examined within this project, 
the analysis has employed the program ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser Version 
1.5.5.28 The program will be used to determine the immediate effects of attempts to 
disrupt the cell, through the breaking of linkages, and the resulting reduction in 
capacity of that cell. The disruption techniques will also attempt to separate the major 
components of the cell. For example, attempt to isolate the bombing team from the 
command team, or the bomb makers from the suicide bombers (if the network allows 
for such isolation). 
 
 
Aum Shinrikyo 
 
Shoko Asahara officially formed Aum Shinrikyo as a religious cult in 1987,29 the 
group’s religious doctrine espoused a combination of Tibetan Buddhism, Hindu 
theology, and yoga.30 This was combined with the belief that in 1997, World War III 
would begin through a conflict between the US and Japan, resulting in the 
Apocalypse.31 The cult was organised into ministries that mirrored the Japanese 
government, in order for a smooth transition when Aum take power.32 Following 
political failure, Aum Shinrikyo began militarisation and a chemical weapons 
program, developing the nerve gases Sarin, Tabun, Soman, and VX, and the 
biological agents Botulism and Anthrax. Aum also unsuccessfully attempted to 
procure the Ebola virus in Zaire.33
 
Aum Shinrikyo conducted the sarin attacks in the Tokyo subway system that killed 
twelve and injured thousands in 1995, and the sarin attack in Matsumoto in 1994 that 
killed seven. Aum also sprayed a non-lethal strand of anthrax into the air in Tokyo. 
By 1995 Aum had between 40 000 and 60 000 members all over the world, and 
combined holdings of US$1 billion.34
 
 
Aum Shinrikyo: Contextual Background  
 
This contextual background is a short synthesis of a more detailed and 
comprehensive background that the relational data for this project was attained from 
and only concerns the stage at which the group is considered to have operated 
covert in its operation.ii In early September of 1993, two Aum Shinrikyo members, 
Kiyohide Hayakawa (the second in command of Aum and Construction Minister) and 
Tsuyoshi Maki, arrived in Australia and purchased the Banjawarn sheep station 600 
kilometres north-west from the Western Australian capital, Perth (after a previous 
visit to and tests conducted on the property) for A$540 000.35
 
On the 9th of September, just days after the purchase of the Banjawarn property, a 
large group consisting of Aum’s Ministry and scientific personnel and experts arrived 
in Perth from Tokyo.36 This group consisted of 25 members of the sect, and included 
seven heads of Aum’s Ministry, and general Aum members of varying rank.37 The 
flight manifesto included Shoko Asahara, (the Aum Shinrikyo leader), Seiichi Endo  
                                                 
ii The period at which the cell is at its most dangerous, usually just before it conducts a terrorist strike. 
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(Minister of Health and Welfare), Tomomitsu Niimi (Minister of Home Affairs), Hideo 
Muari (the Minister of Science and Technology, and astrophysicist),38 Tomomasa 
Nakagawa  (Aum Household Agency Director), and Yoshihiro Inoue (head of Aum’s 
Intelligence Agency).39 These heads and ministers were accompanied by 19 other 
senior to low ranking Aum members including: Aum chemist and physics graduate40 
Tooru Toyoda, who was undertaking his doctoral studies and was a member of the 
Chemical Brigade within the Ministry of Science and Technology, Yutaka Onaya, 
Yuki Kakinuma, Satoru Go, Satoru Shinohara, Hideaki Tatsuta, Wakashio Togashi, 
Naruhito Noda, Akira Hori, and physicist and member of the Chemical Brigade, 
Kenichi Hirose. While the visa applications of most of these individuals read ‘office 
worker’, most held advanced qualifications in the fields of science and technology.41  
 
Following the main group’s arrival at Banjawarn, the individuals at the property who 
were not members of the cult were asked to leave for the duration of the main 
group’s stay.42 Asahara established himself in the main house of Banjawarn, and the 
others lived on the various other quarters of the property.43 On arrival, Aum’s senior 
chemist, Toyoda, quickly established a laboratory in the kitchen of an abandoned 
house on the ranch, about 130 metres from the main homestead.44 The door to this 
lab was marked in Japanese ‘Toyoda Laboratory’,45 and below it in English, ‘Do Not 
Enter’.46 In addition to the extensive scientific equipment the group had such as 
laptop computers, a spectrometer, beakers, Bunsen burners, and various digital 
apparatus, Aum also imported electrical equipment such as transformers, static 
converters, generators, coaxial cabling, batteries, tools, and protective equipment 
into the country through one of their companies Mahaposya Australia.47 The 
chemicals used in this lab were purchased by the group through a wholesaler in 
Perth and were either driven back to the property by the members, or sent to the 
property addressed to Tusyoshi Maki.48 The group purchased copious amounts of 
hydrochloric acid, ammonia solution, perchloric acid, nitric acid, chloroform, sulphuric 
acid, and potassium dichromate. The group also required Thioacetamide, which was 
unavailable from their original wholesaler. Maki flew from Perth to Melbourne and 
back in the same day, just to purchase the chemical worth A$190.49  
 
With the establishment of the laboratory, the chemicals available, and the 
qualifications of the members present, Aum was capable of producing the toxic nerve 
gas sarin and mustard gases at Banjawarn.50 The cult members that worked in the 
Toyoda laboratory manufactured the sarin nerve gas, and conducted the first trials of 
the chemical on 29 sheep on the property.51 The amount of sarin produced by the 
group is unknown; however, only 5 millilitres would have been required to kill the 29 
sheep.52 The sarin produced is most likely to have been an impure form.iii
 
In conjunction with the production of and experimentation with sarin, the group 
attempted to excavate uranium ore from the deposit located at Vickers Well on the 
property.53 In addition to the excavation equipment that the group had flown from 
Japan, including two ditch diggers that they had payed A$5000 each to get to 
Australia, the group hired a backhoe without an operator and purchased a grader 
from a nearby property.54 The group strategically dug large test holes at particular 
points around the area and as they dug, acquired samples down to depths of 
between 12 and 14 feet. The Aum scientists on the property conducted their own 
assay of the samples they collected.55 Aum had intended to export the uranium ore 
back to Japan.56 During the covert stage of this operation, the period that the main 
group is on the property, the group lived together in close proximity, with every 
member interacting on some level with every other member, indicating the highest 
                                                 
iii In the subsequent Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks in 1994 and 1995, an impure form of sarin was also 
used. 
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level of interaction within the cell (specifically from a counter-terrorism point of 
view).57 iv
 
On the 17th of September, just over a week after arriving in Australia, Asahara left for 
Japan on flight QF79 to Tokyo with Toyoda, Kido, Hori, Matsumoto, Niimi, Itonaga, 
Ami, Onaya, Shinohara, Tatsuta, Tanabe, Go, Hirose, Kakinuma, Shimizu, 
Maruhashi, Yamamoto, Muari, Togashi, Noda, and Inoue.58 In the following days a 
majority of the remaining members left the property. Asahara and other members of 
the cult attempted to return to the newly established facility, but were denied visas by 
the Australian government.59 The property was eventually sold for A$330 000 on 
October 4, 1994.60
 
 
Aum Shinrikyo: Relational Data 
 
For the purpose this social network of analysis, the Aum Shinrikyo cell will be 
considered to have been fully operational and fully covert from the arrival of the main 
group to the Banjawarn property on September 9, 1993, and is considered to have 
ceased this activity on the departure of Asahara and his cohort on September 17, 
1993. This is due to the fact that it was in this period that Aum conducted its most 
covert operations: the attempted extraction of uranium ore and the production of the 
nerve gas sarin. The size of this dataset is 21, and includes: 
 
1. Kiyohide Hayakawa 2. Tsuyoshi Maki 
3. Naoko Furusawa 4. Yoshihiro Inoue 
5. Nobuki Ami 6. Masaharu Itonaga 
7. Seiichi Endo 8. Yutaka Onaya 
9. Yuki Kakinuma 10. Satoru Shinohara 
11. Satoru Go 12. Hideaki Tatsuta 
13. Wakashio Togashi 14. Tooru Toyoda 
15. Tomomitsu Niimi 16. Naruhito Noda 
17. Kenichi Hirose 18. Akira Hori 
19. Shoko Asahara 20. Hideo Muari 
21. Tomomasa Nakagawa  
 
The adjacency matrix in table 1 represents the binary relationships between the 
members of the Banjawarn cell that were determined through the contextual 
background. Figure 1 is a sociogram of the Banjawarn cell, clearly demonstrating the 
binary relations of the individuals in the cell. Table 1 and figure 1 demonstrate that 
every member of the cell interacted with every other member during this period. 
 
 
 
iv The other networks examined within the author’s thesis used static weighted representation of 
dynamic relationships, however due to the circumstances of the operation of the Aum cell, the scoring 
of the different relationships was not possible, suffice to say that every individual interacted with every 
other individual within the network. 
Table 1: Aum Shinrikyo Binary Relations 
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HAYAKAWA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MAKI 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FURUSAWA 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
INOUE 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AMI 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ITONAGA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ENDO 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ONAYA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KAKINUMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SHINOHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TATSUTA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TOGASHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TOYODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NIIMI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HIROSE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
HORI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
ASAHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
MUARI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
NAKAGAWA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
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Aum Shinrikyo: Network Criteria Analysis 
 
Table 2: Network Structural Measures 
 CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF 
CONNEXION 
AV. COMMUNICATION 
SPEED 
Score 21 100 20 100 
 
Table 3: Centrality Scores (Standardised) 
 ACTOR DEGREE 
CENTRALITY 
(Standardised) 
BETWEENNESS  
(standardised) 
CLOSENESS  
(standardised) 
HAYAKAWA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
MAKI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
FURUSAWA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
INOUE 100.00 0.00 100.00 
AMI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
ITONAGA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
ENDO 100.00 0.00 100.00 
ONAYA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
KAKINUMA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
SHINOHARA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
GO 100.00 0.00 100.00 
TATSUTA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
TOGASHI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
TOYODA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
NIIMI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
NODA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
HIROSE 100.00 0.00 100.00 
HORI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
ASAHARA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
MUARI 100.00 0.00 100.00 
NAKAGAWA 100.00 0.00 100.00 
 
 
The size of the Aum Shinrikyo cell was 21, a significantly large cell, with individuals in 
the network ranging from the leader of the cult, to ministers, to scientists, and to 
lower ranked members. Most significant was that fact that the group operated with 
100% density, entirely contrary to a traditional ‘covert’ formations adopted by most 
terrorist cells.v A completely dense cell entails maximum possible efficiency, and 
consequentially the minimum possible covertness available through structural 
measures. Operating with a lack of covertness generally indicates that a cell has a 
higher chance of being compromised. 
 
The degree of connexion score of 20 merely confirms that each member of the 
network interacted with every other member of the network during the ‘covert’ period 
of the operation. The average communication speed was 100, again illustrating the 
efficiency of the cell. The cell countered the low covertness of their network through 
the remoteness of their base of operations (Banjawarn), by ordering all non-members 
from the property, and by operating in a nation whose law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies knew very little or nothing at all of the group’s activities in Japan 
and Russia. This allowed Aum to operate without a focus on covertness and still 
                                                 
v Such as the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jemaah Islamiyah cells 
examined in the author’s PhD project. 
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undertake its mission objectives, this is best evidenced by firstly, the success of this 
stage of their operation, and secondly by the fact that this was still achieved following 
charges and convictions against some of these members for carrying dangerous 
goods on an aircraft on arrival in Australia.61
 
Due to the all-channel formation of the network (every node interacted with every 
other node), each member of the network had an equal degree of centrality, 
indicating that each individual had an equal amount of activity within the network. 
Likewise, each individual had identical closeness scores of 100%, signifying each 
node had access to each other node. Once again, each member received the same 
value for betweenness, this value being zero, and indicating that no individual had 
control over the flow of data within the network, due to each individual’s maximum 
closeness. 
  
From the social network analysis measures applied above, it is impossible to 
determine the most important node or nodes within this network, and it is impossible 
to distinguish the relative importance of each individual to the network. 
 
Figure 2: Original Sociogram 
 
 
Aum Shinrikyo: Destabilisation Techniques 
 
Because it is not possible to identify the nodes of critical structural importance 
through sociometric measures, it is not possible to use the traditional measures to 
attempt to destabilise the cell. For example, figure 2 shows the original Aum network 
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in figure 1 (through the ORA program). Because each of the nodes in the network are 
of equal importance and centrality, it does not matter which node is targeted (the 
removal of each will have the same effect). Figure 3 shows the cell following the 
removal of Toyoda from the network. Following this removal, the formation remains 
the same (all-channel), the communication speed remains the same (1.00), and all of 
the centrality scores remain the same. The only effect the removal of Toyoda has 
had on the structural measures is the size and degree of connexion (20 and 19). 
While the Aum cell exhibits an extreme lack of covertness in the structural formation, 
the 100% density and the resulting effectiveness of the cell make it theoretically 
extremely difficult to destabilise.  
 
Figure 3: Toyoda Removal 
 
 
 
As has been demonstrated, there are no nodes that are of critical structural 
importance to the network, which makes it impossible to significantly reduce the 
information and communication flow within the network, and likewise to reduce the 
decision making capability and the effectiveness of the network. This density also 
makes it impossible to separate critical sections of the network through the removal 
of a small amount of nodes. Because the ranking leaders within the network are 
clearly and definitively identifiable through the contextual background, this allows 
attempts at destabilisation through targeting the Aum ministry members aiming to 
reduce the decision making capacity and the effectiveness of the network. The 
members to be targeted are the ministry members and the supreme leader: 
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Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, Muari, and Asahara. This hierarchical 
method merely seeks to increase the effectiveness of the measures by attempting to 
reduce the decision making capacity of the network. 
 
Figure 4 shows a hierarchical model of the Aum network represented in figure 1. This 
model was determined by the ranks of the individuals, and who their orders were 
given to. This is basically a visual representation of the hierarchical structure 
synthesised from a more detailed contextual background. This model clearly 
illustrates the command structure of the Aum network, and allows destabilisation 
techniques to be aimed at this command structure. It must be noted that this model is 
not synthesised from social network analysis, and is not a sociograph, but is merely a 
graph used to visually demonstrate the effectiveness of targeting the highly ranked 
nodes of the network to disrupt the decision making capacity. This measure attempts 
to remove all command members from the network, and leave the remaining cell 
members without any orders or hierarchy in an attempt to significantly reduce the 
decision making capacity of the cell. The high ranking individuals within the network 
were signified by the red nodes in figure 1, however, figure 4 more clearly 
demonstrates the hierarchical relations between the leaders and followers of the 
network. The hierarchical model shows Asahara at the top of the network as the 
‘supreme leader’, followed by Hayakawa as his second in charge. Next are the 
ministry members who received their orders from both Asahara and Hayakawa. 
Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, and Muari, all gave and passed down 
orders to the rest of the network. 
 
 
Destabilisation measures that are employed against all-channel networks cannot aim 
at reducing the information and communication flow, the effectiveness of the network, 
or the isolation of components of the network. The destabilisation method proposed 
requires the conclusive identification of every leader and their rank within the network 
through the contextual background, as was possible in the case of the Aum 
Banjawarn cell. This method may also require multiple steps to significantly reduce 
the decision making capacity of the cell, seven in the case of Aum. Even after the 
complete removal of the cell hierarchy, an all-channel network of 14 nodes still 
remains. 
 
Despite these issues, all-channel networks operate with minimum covertness and 
due to their high density, the exposure of one node by counter-terrorism authorities 
should very quickly lead to the exposure of all of the other nodes within the network. 
This is the case with the Banjawarn cell. In practice, if counter terrorism authorities 
targeted and exposed a single individual within the network, this would have 
potentially given them links to twenty other individuals and the Banjawarn property, 
and hence the exposure of every other node within the network.  
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Applications 
 
To sum, the network formation and modus operandi adopted by Aum Shinrikyo was 
vastly different from traditional terrorist cells, which are covert, dispersed, and 
dynamic. Despite the extreme effectiveness of the Aum cell and its apparent 
resistance to traditional destabilisation methods, the capture of one node within the 
network would have the potential to lead counter-terrorism authorities to every node 
in the network due to the total lack of structural covertness. Thus, the best 
destabilisation method for an all-channel network is to target the highest ranking 
nodes in the network that have been identified through the contextual background, 
and remove these nodes from the network to increase the effectiveness of such 
techniques. This measure aims to reduce the decision making capacity of the cell, 
discover and compromise the links to other nodes in the network (due to the 
network’s low covertness) and consequentially neutralise the remaining nodes. As 
we have seen, the removal of any number of nodes from an all-channel network 
leaves identical centrality and communication scores. In short, to destabilise an all-
channel network requires the removal of a significantly high number of (preferably 
high ranking) nodes. This neutralisation is made infinitely easier through the speed at 
which the rest of the network can be identified. Despite generating a strategy to 
destabilise this all-channel network, the method failed to identify any critical nodes 
within the network, at which counter-terrorism operations should be aimed, this 
shows some weakness of the utility of social network analysis against cells that focus 
on maximum efficiency.vi However, the methodology provided significant levels of 
insight and understanding into the cell, its interaction and communication, its modus 
operandi, and allowed for adequate destabilisation techniques. 
 
This paper conducted a social network analysis of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist cell 
that operated in Western Australia in 1993. This analysis has provided substantive 
and in-depth analysis of a terrorist cell that has operated in Australia. Furthermore, 
this analysis has provided a richer and deeper understanding and insight into how 
the cell operated, communicated, and has provided measures to destabilise this cell.  
The destabilisation techniques that were proposed in this paper are applicable to any 
terrorist or covert organisation operating in all-channel networks, or all-channel 
clusters within larger networks. 
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